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The framing of the Australian Constitution initiated a
pattern of discrimination against Australia's Indigenous
peoples. They were cast as outsiders to the nation
brought about in 1901. This pattern was broken in 1967
by the deletion of the discriminatory provisions from
the Constitution. Today, there is strong community
support in Australia for the reconciliation process,
which would involve recognition of Indigenous peoples
as an integral and unique component of the Australian
nation. However, this has yet to be translated into
substantive legal outcomes. The author analyses the
interaction of issues of race and the Australian
Constitution as it has affected Australia's Aboriginal
peoples, and concludes with an examination of
contemporary proposals for reform.
Une discrimination routini~re s'est faite envers les
peuples autochtones de I'Australie dans le cadre de la
constitution australienne. Malgr6 que les peuples
autochtones furent trait6s d'6trangers depuis la
creation de la nation en 1901, ceci a 0t6 rectifi6 en
1967 par l'dlimination des dispositions discriminatoires
de la constitution. En Australie aujourd'hui, un
sentiment d'appui communautaire existe vis-A-vis un
processus de reconciliation qui aurait comme objectif la
reconnaissance des peuples autochtones comme 6tant
une composante integrale et unique de la nation
australienne. Toutefois, ce processus doit encore se
traduire en rdsultats juridiques substantifs. L'auteur
analyse l'interaction entre les questions de race et la
constitution australienne tel que cela a affect6 les
peuple autochtones. L'auteur conclut en examinant
des propositions de reformes contemporaines.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The year 2001 marks the centenary of the Australian
Constitution.1 It has been a focal point for celebration about how
Australia, like Canada, has become one of the oldest continuous
democracies in the world. Since 1901, the Australian Constitution has
withstood political crises and the passage of time to produce a stable
democracy responsive to and representative of the people. This has been
a crucial factor in the economic and other successes of the Australian
nation.
There has been much discussion over the course of those one
hundred years about the achievements of the Australian legal system in
protecting human rights, and about how this has been brought about
without a bill of rights and the divisive and charged debates that have
characterized the United States, and more recently the Canadian,
constitutional systems. Over thirty years ago, Sir Robert Menzies,
Australia's longest serving Prime Minister, proudly stated that "the
rights of individuals in Australia are as adequately protected as they are
in any other country in the world."2 He argued that Australia did not
need a bill of rights because basic freedoms were adequately protected
by the common law and by the good sense of elected representatives,
who are constrained by the doctrine of responsible government (that is,
the notion that the prime minister and ministers are answerable for their
actions in the parliament). This reflected the views of the framers of the
Australian Constitution expressed in the 1890s. Sir Owen Dixon, a former
1 The Constitution, as enacted by the Commonwealth ofAustralia Constitution Act 1900, 63 &
64 Victoria, c. 12 (U.K.), came into force on 1 January 1901 [hereinafter Australian Constitution].
2 R. Menzies, Central Power in the Australian Commonwealth (London: Cassell, 1967) at 54.
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Chief Justice of the High Court, suggested in 1965 that the framers
rhetorically asked: "[why] should doubt be thrown on the wisdom and
safety of entrusting to the chosen representatives of the people ... all
legislative power, substantially without fetter or restriction?" 3 ,
On 18 February 2000, Prime Minister John Howard, in
discussing mandatory minimum sentencing on national radio, stated that
"Australia's human rights reputation compared with the rest of the
world is quite magnificent." 4 Here, he expressed the commonly held
view, and implied that the record underlying the reputation is just as
good. Australians like to think that their basic rights are well protected.
Of course, in the main this is correct. Australians are fortunate that the
rule of law is firmly entrenched in their political culture, and that they
have an independent High Court. However, there are many examples of
where the legal system has failed sections of Australian society.
Visions of an excellent human rights record in Australia are not
consistent with a careful and considered examination of the historical
record. Even today, Australia suffers from significant and continuing
problems, and issues of human rights are at the forefront of debate. For
example, the regime of mandatory minimum sentencing for minor
property offences operating since March 1997 in the Northern Territory5
has meant that the imprisonment rates of Indigenous women and
children have risen alarmingly, including for offences such as the stealing
of a packet of biscuits valued at three dollars. The legislation imposes a
"three strikes and you're in" policy under which a third minor property
offence will lead to automatic imprisonment of not less than twelve
months. 6
Political agitators can also find themselves faced with jail. In
1996, Albert Langer was imprisoned for ten weeks for distributing
leaflets encouraging voters to put the candidates of the major parties
"equal last." 7 He breached section 329(a) of the Commonwealth
Electoral Act 1918 (Cth), which provided that a person could not
advocate a preferential vote numbered "1, 2, 3, 3." Langer challenged
3 0. Dixon, "Two Constitutions Compared" in Hon. J. Woinarski, ed., Jesting Pilate and Other
Papers and Addresses (Sydney: Law Book, 1965) 100 at 102.
4 Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Radio Broadcast, "AM Program" (18 February 2000).
5 Sentencing Act 1995 (N.T.), as am. by the Sentencing Act (No 2) 1996 (N.T.) and the
SentencingAmendment Act 1998 (N.T.).
6 Sentencing Act 1995 (N.T.), s. 78A. This regime was challenged in the courts on constitutional
grounds, but was upheld by the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory in Wynbyne v. Marshall
(1997), 117 N.T.R 11. Special leave to appeal to the High Court was refused.
7 On appeal, the length of the sentence was reduced.
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this section in the High Court, but failed. In a strong dissent, Justice Sir
Daryl Dawson described section 329(a) as "a law which is designed to
keep from voters information which is required by them to enable them
to exercise an informed choice."8 After the High Court finding, Amnesty
International released a statement describing Langer as "the first
prisoner of conscience in the country for over 20 years." 9
It might be argued that Australia is simply at par with other
comparable nations, which continue to have their own human rights
concerns. After all, Canada has its own debates on the appropriateness
of mandatory minimum sentencing.10 However, Australia differs from
these other nations in one crucial respect. It has not yet developed a
statement setting out the basic rights and freedoms of the Australian
people. Other common law nations have already done this: Canada in
1982,11 New Zealand in 199012 and even the United Kingdom (from
which Australia's legal system is derived) in 1998.13 Australia has been
left behind, its legal system quarantined from human rights
developments in other nations with which it has shared a common legal
framework. 14 While each of these nations, like Australia, had relied
upon the common law tradition to protect rights, they have since
recognised the need to supplement this with a bill of rights.
The critical weakness of the Australian constitutional and legal
system lies in the area of human rights and race. The Australian
Constitution was drafted explicitly to facilitate the enactment of racially
discriminatory laws. This has affected one segment of the Australian
population more than any other: Australia's Aboriginal or Indigenous
8 Langerv. Commonwealth (1996), 186 C.LR. 302 at 325.
9 Amnesty International, Press Release ASA 120051996, "Australia: Political Activist Becomes
First Prisoner of Conscience for over 20 Years" (23 February 1996).
10 See, for example, the controversy surrounding the decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada in R v. Latimer, [2001] 193 D.L.R. (4th) 577.
11 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
12 New Zealand Bill of RightsAct, 1990, No. 109.
13 Human RightsAct 1998 (U.K.), 1998, c. 42.
14 According to Chief Justice Spigelman of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, within a
decade, British and Canadian court decisions in many areas of the law may become
"incomprehensible to Australian lawyers." He has warned that the "Australian common law
tradition is threatened with a degree of intellectual isolation that many would find disturbing." Hon.
J. Spigelman, "Access to Justice and Human Rights Treaties" (2000) 22 Sydney L. Rev. 141 at 150.
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peoples,15 who inhabited Australia for uncounted thousands of years
before white settlement in 1788. While the Australian Constitution has
produced stable democratic government, it has failed Indigenous
peoples. This article focuses on this aspect of the Australian Constitution,
and the challenges it continues to present today. Part II examines the
position of Indigenous peoples under the Australian Constitution at the
time of Federation. Part III analyses constitutional and other
developments since Federation and examines the recent decision of the
Australian High Court in Kartinyeri v. Commonwealth (Hindmarsh Island
Bridge Case).16 Part IV looks at the current reconciliation process in
Australia. Part V examines proposals for legal reform as part of this
process.
II. FEDERATION: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND THE
AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION
The Australian Constitution was not written as a people's
constitution. Instead, it was a compact between the six Australian
colonies designed to meet, amongst other things, the needs of trade and
commerce.1 7 Consequently, the Australian Constitution says more about
the marriage of the colonies and the powers of their progeny, the
Commonwealth, than it does about the relationship between Australians
and their government. The document does not expressly embody the
fundamental rights or aspirations of the Australian people. It contains
few provisions that are explicitly rights-orientated.18 According to Lois
O'Donoghue, a former chairperson of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Commission (ATSic):
15 There is no accepted legal definition of what it means to be Aboriginal in Australia. In one
study conducted in 1986, John McCorquodale found no less than sixty-seven different definitions of
Aboriginal people: see J. McCorquodale, "The Legal Classification of Race in Australia" (1986)
10:1 Aboriginal History 7 at 9. See also, Parliament of Australia Library, The Definition of
Aboriginality (Research Note 18) by J. Gardiner-Garden (Canberra: Parliament of Australia
Parliamentary Library, 2000), online: Parliament of Australia <http:llwww.aph.gov.aullibrary/pubs/
m/2000-01/01RN18.htm> (date accessed: 5 June 2001).
16 (1998), 195 C.L.R. 337 [hereinafter Hindmarsh Island Bridge Case].
1 7 See, for example, Australian Constitution, supra note 1, s. 92 which states: "trade, commerce,
and intercourse among the States ... shall be absolutely free." As Manning Clark has argued, the
Constitution was written by drafters who "wanted a Constitution that would make capitalist society
hum": M. Clark, "The People and the Constitution" in S. Encel, D. Home & R. Thompson, eds.,
Change the Rules!: Towards a Democratic Constitution (New York: Penguin, 1977) 9 at 18.
18 G. Williams, Human Rights Under the Australian Constitution (Melbourne: Oxford
University Press, 1999) at 47-50 [hereinafter Human Rights].
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[i]t says very little about what it is to be Australian. It says practically nothing about how
we find ourselves here-save being an amalgamation of former colonies. It says nothing
of how we should behave towards each other as human beings and as Australians. 19
The Australian Constitution was drafted at two conventions held
in the 1890s. 20 Neither convention included any women, 21 nor
representatives of Australia's Indigenous peoples and ethnic
communities. In most cases, Aboriginal people were not qualified to
vote for the delegates to the Convention,22 and appear to have played no
meaningful role in the drafting process itself2 3 It is not surprising, then,
that the Australian Constitution as drafted did not reflect their interests
or aspirations. The preamble makes no mention of the prior occupation
of Australia by its Indigenous peoples.24 In fact, the operative provisions
of the Australian Constitution were premised upon their exclusion, and
even discrimination against them. This, then, was the legal foundation
upon which Aboriginal people were made part of the Commonwealth of
Australia on 1 January 1901.
19 F. Brennan, Securing a Bountiful Place forAborigines and Torres Strait Islanders in a Modern,
Free and Tolerant Australia (Carlton, Vic.: Constitutional Centenary Foundation, 1994) at 18.
20 G. Craven, ed., The Convention Debates, 1891-1898: Commentaries, Indices and Guide
(Sydney: Legal Books, 1986). See generally on the making of the Australian Constitution: J.A. La
Nauze, The Making of the Australian Constitution (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1972);
and J. Quick & R. Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth (Sydney:
Angus and Robertson, 1901) [hereinafter Annotated Constitution].
21 Catherine Helen Spence stood for election as a South Australian delegate to the 1897-1898
convention; she was unsuccessful: see D. Headon, "No Weak-Kneed Sister: Catherine Helen
Spence and 'Pure Democracy' in H. Irving, ed., A Woman's Constitution?: Gender and History in the
Australian Commonwealth (Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1996) 42.
22 Parliament of Australia Library, The Constitution-19th Century Colonial Office Document
or'a People's Constitution? (Background Paper) by A. Twomey (Canberra: Parliament of Australia
Parliamentary Library, 1994).
23 Brennan, supra note 19 at 6.
24 The preamble of the Australian Constitution, supra note 1, states:
WHEREAS the people of New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Queensland, and
Tasmania, humbly relying on the blessing of Almighty God, have agreed to unite in one
indissoluble Federal Commonwealth under the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland, and under the Constitution hereby established:
And whereas it is expedient to provide for the admission into the Commonwealth of
other Australian Colonies and possessions of the Queen:
Be it therefore enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice
and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present
Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows.
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The Australian Constitution of 1901 in many ways resembles the
British North America Act, 186725 that founded the Canadian nation. It
differs, however, in its explicit negative treatment of Indigenous peoples.
Section 51(xxvi) of the Australian Constitution provided that the
Commonwealth Parliament could legislate with respect to "the people of
any race, other than the aboriginal race in any State, for whom it is
deemed necessary to make special laws." 26 This was the so-called "races
power." Section 127 went further in providing: "In reckoning the
numbers of the people of the Commonwealth, or of a State or other part
of the Commonwealth, aboriginal natives shall not be counted." 27
Significantly, neither provision spoke of Indigenous peoples as people,
but in the latter case as "aboriginal natives." 28
Section 51(xxvi) was inserted into the Australian Constitution to
allow the Commonwealth to discriminate against sections of the
community on account of their race. Of course, Aboriginal people were
not subject to this section. However, this was not because they were to
be protected, but because it was thought that the Aboriginal issues were
a matter for the States and not the federal government. By today's
standards, the reasoning behind section 51(xxvi) was clearly racist.
Edmund Barton, the leader of the 1897-1898 .Convention and
subsequently Australia's first Prime Minister, stated at the 1898
Convention in Melbourne that the power was necessary to enable the
Commonwealth to "regulate the affairs of the people of coloured or
inferior races who are in the Commonwealth." 29 In summarising the
effect of section 51(xxvi), John Quick and Robert Garran, writing in
1901, stated that:
It enables the Parliament to deal with the people of any alien race after they have entered
the Commonwealth; to localise them within defined areas, to restrict their migration, to
confine them to certain occupations, or to give them special protection and secure their
return after a certain period to the country whence they came.
30
2 5 British North America Act, 1867 (U.K.) 30-31 Vict., c. 3.
26 On the drafting of section 51(xxvi), see M.J. Detmold, "Original Intentions and the Race
Power" (1997) 8 Public L. Rev. 244; and J. Williams & J. Bradsen, "The Perils of Inclusion: The
Constitution and the Race Power" (1997) 19 Adelaide L. Rev. 95.
27 On the evolution of s. 127, see La Nauze, supra note 20 at 67-68; and G. Sawer "The
Australian Constitution and the Australian Aborigine" (1966) 2 Fed. L. Rev. 17.
28 Compare the use of "people" in other provisions such as ss. 7, 24 of the Australian
Constitution, supra note 1.
29 Australia, Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates, Melbourne, vol. 4,
1898 (Sydney: Legal Books, 1986) at 228-29 [hereinafter Melbourne Convention 1898].
30 Annotated Constitution, supra note 20 at 622.
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One framer, Andrew Inglis Clark, the Tasmanian Attorney General,
supported a provision taken from the United States Constitution
requiring the "equal protection of the laws." 31 This clause might have
prevented the federal and state Parliaments from discriminating on the
basis of race. However, the framers were concerned that Clark's clause
would override Western Australian laws under which "no Asiatic or
African alien can get a miner's right or go mining on a gold-field."32
Clark's provision was rejected by the framers who instead inserted
section 117 of the Australian Constitution, which merely prevents
discrimination on the basis of state residence.3 3 Sir John Forrest,
Premier of Western Australia, summed up the mood of the 1897-1898
convention when he stated that:
It is of no use for us to shut our eyes to the fact that there is a great feeling all over
Australia against the introduction of coloured persons. It goes without saying that we do
not like to talk about it, but still it is so. I do not want this clause to pass in a shape which
would undo what is about to be done in most of the colonies, and what has already been
done in Western Australia, in regard to that class of persons.34
In-formulating the words of section 117, Henry Higgins, one of the early
justices of the High Court, argued that it "would allow Sir John Forrest
... to have his law with regard to Asiatics not being able to obtain
miners' rights in Western Australia. There is no discrimination there
based on residence or citizenship; it is simply based upon colour and
race."35
III. A CENTURY OF NEGLECT
Given the drafting history of the Australian Constitution, it is not
surprising that legislation enacted by the new Commonwealth
Parliament was premised upon racially discriminatory policies. The
Immigration Restriction Act 1901 (Cth), for example, prohibited the
31 Australia, Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates, Melbourne, vol. 1,
1891 (Sydney: Legal Books, 1986) at 962.
32 Melbourne Convention 1898, supra note 29 at 665.
33 Section 117 of the Australian Constitution, supra note ?, provides: "A subject of the Queen,
resident in any State, shall not be subject in any other State to any disability or discrimination which
would not be equally applicable to him if he were a subject of the Queen resident in such other
State." See Human Rights, supra note 18 at 47-50.
3 4 Melbodme Convention 1898, supra note 29 at 666.
35 Australia, Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates, Melbourne, vol. 5,
1898 (Sydney: Legal Books, 1986) at 1801.
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immigration into Australia of any person who, when asked by an officer,
was unable to "write out at dictation and sign in the presence of the
officer a passage of fifty words in length in a European language
directed by the officer." 36 This was the means by which the White
Australia policy was implemented.
Of more significance to Aboriginal people was legislation that
denied them the right to vote in federal elections. Prior to Federation,
Aborigines other than freeholders were excluded from the Queensland
franchise by section 6 of the Elections Act 1885 (Qld.)37 In Western
Australia, a similar disqualification was imposed by section 12 of the
Constitution Amendment Act 1893 (W.A.).38 New South Wales, South
Australia, Tasmania, and Victoria imposed no such disqualification, and
accordingly Aborigines in those states were entitled to vote for the first
federal parliament in 1901. Section 41 of the Australian Constitution
provided that "no adult person" entitled to vote at state elections should
be prevented from voting at federal elections "by any law of the
Commonwealth." 39 Clearly, at the first federal election in 1901i this
provision operated to ensure that Aborigines in all states except
Queensland and Western Australia were entitled to vote.
The scope of the federal franchise was determined after
Federation by the Commonwealth Franchise Act 1902 (Cth).40 That Act
extended the federal franchise to women, and it had been proposed that
the bill also extend the franchise to Aborigines. However, the latter
proposal was strongly resisted and was finally defeated. Among its
opponents were Isaac Isaacs, subsequently chief justice of the High
Court and Australia's first Australian governor general, who thought
Aborigines "have not the intelligence, interest or capacity" to vote;41 and
Henry Higgins, who thought it "utterly inappropriate... [to] ask them to
exercise an intelligent vote."42
As finally enacted, section 4 of the Franchise Act specifically
denied the voting rights of the "aboriginal native[s] of Australia...
3 6 Immigration Restriction Act 1901 (Cth), s. 3.
37 Section 6 stated: "No aboriginal native of Australia, India, China, or of the South Sea
Islands...
38 Section 12 stated: "No aboriginal native of Australia, India, China, or of the South Sea
Islands...."
39 See Human Rights, supra note 18 at 96-103.
40 Hereinafter Franchise Act.
41 Australia, House of Representatives, Hansard (24 April 1902) at 11979.
42 Ibid. at 11977.
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unless so entitled under Section 41 of the Constitution." It was not until
1962 that the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) was amended to
extend universal adult suffrage to Aboriginal people.43 In the meantime,
even when Aboriginal people were entitled to vote as a matter of law
under section 41 of the Australian Constitution, as a matter of
administrative practice they were denied that right.44
A. The 1967 Referendum
The obvious discrimination against Aboriginal people on the
face of the Australian Constitution was one factor in the emergence of
moves to amend it. Another factor was a concern that Aboriginal issues
were not being dealt with appropriately at the state level and that the
federal parliament ought to be given primary responsibility for their
welfare. In 1967, a proposal was put before the Australian people under
which the words "other than the aboriginal race in any State" in section
51(xxvi) would be struck out, and section 127 deleted entirely.45 The
people overwhelming voted "Yes". The proposal was supported in every
state and nationally by 89.34 per cent of Australians, with 9.08 per cent
voting "No."46 Of the forty-four referendum proposals put to Australian
people since 1901, this is the highest "Yes" vote so far achieved.
The 1967 referendum was an important turning point in the
place of Aboriginal people within the Australian legal structure.
However, it is important to note that, while the referendum deleted an
obviously discriminatory provision in the form of section 127, it did not
insert anything in its place. Indigenous peoples were not granted any
particular rights to land or otherwise. The change left the Australian
43 Even then, unlike other Australians, it was not compulsory for Aborigines to enrol to vote:
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1962 (Cth). Equality for Indigenous people at Commonwealth
elections did not eventuate until 1983, when the Commonwealth Electoral Amendment Act 1983
(Cth) made enrolment for, and voting in, Commonwealth elections compulsory for Aboriginal
Australians.
44 T. Blackshield & G. Williams, Australian Constitutional Law and Theory: Commentary and
Materials, 2nd ed. (Annandale, N.S.W.: Federation Press, 1998) at 160-61 [hereinafter Australian
Constitutional Law and Theory]. See also, P. Stretton & C. Finnimore, "Black Fellow Citizens:
Aborigines and the Commonwealth Franchise" (1993) 25 Australian Hist. Stud. 521.
45 Amendment of the Australian Constitution is provided for by section 128. A successful
change under section 128 must be: (1) passed by an absolute majority of both houses of the federal
parliament, or by one house twice; and (2) at a referendum, passed by a majority of the people as a
whole, and by h majority of the people in a majority of the states (that is, in at least four of the six
states).
4 6Australian Constitutional Law and Theory, supra note 44 at 1186.
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Constitution, including the preamble, devoid of any reference to
Indigenous peoples. While the objective of the 1967 referendum was to
remove discriminatory references to Aboriginal people from the
Australian Constitution and to allow the Commonwealth to take over
responsibility for their welfare, it may be that, in failing to set this
intention into the words of the Australian Constitution, the change
actually laid the seeds for the Commonwealth to pass laws that impose a
disadvantage upon them. The racially discriminatory underpinnings of
section 51(xxvi) were extended to Aboriginal people, but without any
textual indication that the power could be applied only for their benefit.
If the referendum enabled the "races power" to be used to legislate for
the detriment of Aboriginal people, it would be a sad irony. It would
undermine the powerful symbolism attached to the 1967 referendum,
which is viewed in Australia as Indigenous peoples' most significant
political victory.
B. The Hindmarsh Island Bridge Case
The possibility that the "races power," as extended to Indigenous
peoples, might be applied to their detriment was raised in a case before
the High Court of Australia in 1998. Hindmarsh Island ("Kumarangk")
is in the Murray River delta in South Australia. During the 1980s, there
was commercial development on the island, and in 1989, as a condition
of planning approval for a marina development, it was proposed that a
bridge be constructed from the island to the mainland. This proposal
met strong opposition on Aboriginal heritage grounds, since the island
and the Goolwa Channel area in which it was located were part of the
traditional home of the Ngarrindjeri people. The Minister for Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander Affairs was urged to exercise his powers under
the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984
(Cth)47 for the protection and preservation of the area. Ngarrindjeri
women claimed to be the custodians of secret "women's business" for
which the island had traditionally been used, and which could not be
disclosed to Ngarrindjeri men, nor to other men.
In 1994 and 1996, the claim was the subject of two reports to the
Minister. Each report ended in a controversy that failed to resolve the
underlying issue. The Hindmarsh Island Bridge Act 1997 (Cth)48 was then
enacted by the newly elected Howard (Liberal-National Party) Coalition
47 Hereinafter Heritage Protection Act.
48 Hereinafter Bridge Act.
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Government to preclude any further possibility of a protection order
under the 1984 Act. The Bridge Act amended the Heritage Protection Act
so that it no longer applied to "the Hindmarsh Island bridge area" and
thus prevented any further possible claim by the Ngarrindjeri women.
The Ngarrindjeri women responded by bringing an action in the
High Court challenging the validity of the Bridge Act. They argued, with
myself as part of their legal team, that the Bridge Act could not be passed
under the races power because that power extends only to laws for the
benefit of a particular race, and cannot be used to impose a detriment on
the people of a race. This argument was of momentous political
significance because, if accepted, it might have provided a legal platform
from which to challenge the Howard Government's "ten point plan" for
native title. I will expand upon this point in part IV.
In the High Court, the Commonwealth argued that there are no
limits 'to the races power, that is, provided that the law affixes a
consequence based upon race, it is not for the High Court to examine
the positive or negative impact of the law. On the afternoon of the first
day of the hearing, the Commonwealth Solicitor General, Gavan
Griffith, suggested that the races power "is infused with a power of
adverse operation." 49 He acknowledged "the direct racist content of this
provision" in the sense of "a capacity for adverse operation."50 The
following exchange then occurred:
Kirby J: Can I just get clear in my mind, is the Commonwealth's submission that it is
entirely and exclusively for the Parliament to determine the matter upon which special
laws are deemed necessary ... or is there a point at which there is a justiciable question
for the Court? I mean, it seems unthinkable that a law such as the Nazi race laws could be
enacted under the race power and that this Court could do nothing about it.
Griffith QC: Your Honour, if there was a reason why the Court could do something
about it, a Nazi law, it would, in our submission, be for a reason external to the races
power. It would be for some wider over-arching reason.51
Of course, without a bill of rights or express protection against racial
discrimination, theie was no such over-arching reason.
The case was decided by only six judges because Justice Callinan,
after some initial reluctance, disqualified himself from deciding the
49 Transcript, Kartinyeri v. Commonwealth A29/1997 (5 February 1998), online: the
Australasian Legal Information Institute <http-www. austlii .edu.au /au/other /hca/ transcripts/ 1997
/A29/3.html> (date accessed: 5 June 2001).
50Ibid
51 lbid
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matter.52 The challenge by the Ngarrindjeri women failed by five-to-one
(with Justice Kirby dissenting), because, in the words of Chief Justice
Brennan and Justice McHugh: "Once the true scope of the legislative
powers conferred by section 51 [is] perceived, it is clear thai the power
which supports a valid Act supports an Act repealing it."S3 It was
common ground that the Heritage Protection Act was valid. Hence, it
necessarily followed that a later modification of its operation must also
be valid. This conclusion meant that Brennan and McHugh did not need
to address the scope of the races power.
The other four judges did address that issue. Justices Gummow
and Hayne held that the power could be used, as in this case, to
withdraw a benefit previously granted to Aboriginal people (and thus to
impose a disadvantage). More generally, they pointed out that the use of
"race" as a criterion, which section 51(xxvi) not only permits but
requires, is inherently discriminatory, and that any discriminatory
measure which benefits some may disadvantage others. They did,
however, leave open the suggestion raised in the Native Title Act CaseS4
that the court might retain "some supervisory jurisdiction to examine ...
the possibility of a manifest abuse of the races power."55 Moreover, they
hinted at the possible relevance in such a case of the ultimate power of
judicial review under Marbury v. Madison,S6 and of Justice Dixon's
suggestion in the Communist Party CaseS7 that in the Australian
Constitution "the rule of law forms an assumption."
Justice Kirby's dissenting judgment held that the races power
"does not extend to the enactment of laws detrimental to, or
discriminatory against, the people of any race (including the Aboriginal
race)."SS He argued that the 1967 amendment "did not simply lump the
Aboriginal people of Australia in with other races as potential targets for
detrimental or adversely discriminatory laws," but reflected the
parliament's "clear and unanimous object," with "unprecedented
support" from the people, that the operation of section 51(xxvi) "should
52 Justice Callinan had previously advised the Commonwealth that the Act was
constitutionally valid: see S. Tilmouth & G. Williams, "The High Court and the Disqualification of
One of its Own" (1999) 73 Australian LJ. 72.
5 3 Hindmarsh Island Bridge Case, supra note 16 at 376.
54 Western Australia v. Commonwealth (1995), 183 C.LR. 373 at 460.
5 5 Ibid. at 460.
56 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
5 7 Australian Communist Party v. Commonwealth (1951), 83 C.L.R. 1 at 193.
58 Hindmarsh Island Bridge Case, supra note 16 at 411.
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be significantly altered" so as to permit only positive or benign
discrimination 5 9
Justice Gaudron, who had previously suggested that a limitation
of the races power to beneficial purposes had "much to commend it,"60
concluded that on closer examination such a limitation could not be
sustained-in part because the suggestion that the original effect of the
power had been changed by the 1967 amendment was too weighty a
consequence to ascribe to a "minimalist amendment." 61 The deletion of
eight words could not change the meaning of the words that remained.
However, she went on to examine more closely the requirement in
section 51(xxvi) that the parliament must deem it "necessary" to make
special laws for the people of a race. Applying an analysis of the concept
of discrimination, Gaudron argued that any such judgment of necessity
must be based on some "relevant difference between the people of the
race to whom the law is directed and the people of other races," and
hence that the resulting legislation "must be reasonably capable of being
viewed as appropriate and adapted to the difference asserted." 62 These
tests, she suggested, might give operable meaning to the concept of
"manifest abuse." 63 Further, she found it "difficult to conceive" that any
adverse discrimination by reference to racial criteria might nowadays
satisfy these tests, and "even more difficult" in the case of a law relating
to Aboriginal Australians, since any obvious "relevant difference" in
their situation is one of "serious disadvantage," including "their material
circumstances and the vulnerability of their culture."64 On the face of it,
therefore, "only laws directed to remedying their disadvantage could
reasonably be viewed as appropriate and adapted to their different
circumstances." 65
The overall effect of the judgments was inconclusive. The Court
split two-to-two on the scope of the races power, with a further two
judges not deciding. It thus failed to resolve the issue of whether the
Commonwealth possesses the power under the Australian Constitution to
enact racially discriminatory laws. This possibility has reinforced calls for
5 9 Ibid. at 413.
6 0 Lim v. Minister for Immigration, Local Government, and Ethnic Affairs (1992), 76 C.L.R. 1 at
56.
61 Hindmarsh Island Bridge Case, supra note 16 at 366.
62 Ibid.
63 1Ibid.
64 1bid. at 367.
65 Ibid.
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an Australian bill of rights.66 The result in the case could hardly be said
to be a solid foundation from which to advance reconciliation. It is not
surprising then that reconciliation requires a re-examination of the
Australian Constitution.
IV. THE PRESENT: RECONCILIATION
The decision in the Hindmarsh Island Bridge Case coincided with
the beginning of a dramatic rise in popular support for the reconciliation
movement. The reconciliation movement comprises many grassroots
organisations, such as Australians for Native Title and Reconciliation,
and is supported by ATSIC. Politically, the process is overseen by a federal
Minister for Reconciliation.
The government centrepiece of the movement is the Council for
Aboriginal Reconciliation, which was established by statute in 199167
and was wound up at the end of 2000.68 The council undertook a decade
of promoting and laying down strategies for the reconciliation process.
The council's vision of reconciliation was as follows: "A united Australia
which respects this land of ours; values the Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander heritage; and provides justice and equity for all." 69 The final
report of the council was publicly delivered in December 2000 to
political leaders including the prime minister and the leader of the,
opposition. After a slow start and years of being dogged by controversy
and resignations, the council was able to achieve greater public success
in the final year of its term. The rise in popular support for
reconciliation generally was brought about by events such as those
described below.
66 See G. Williams, A Bill of Rights for Australia (Sydney: University of New South Wales
Press, 2000).
67 The Council was established as a statutory authority on 2 September 1991 when the Council
forAboriginal Reconciliation Act 1991 (Cth) received the Royal Assent.
68 Its successor is Reconciliation Australia Limited, a private charitable foundation.
69 Australia, Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Final Report of the Councilfor Aboriginal
Reconciliation to the Prime Minister and the Commonwealth Parliament (Commonwealth of
Australia: Canberra, 2000) at xiii [hereinafter Final Report].
20001
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
A. Native Title
Indigenous Australians achieved their most significant legal
victory in 1992, when the High Court in Mabo v. Queensland (No 2)70
held that Aboriginal Australians possess a right to "native title" over
their traditional lands and that this was not overridden upon British
acquisition of sovereignty. It was held that such title is a continuing right
except where it has been expressly extinguished. Subsequently, in 1996 in
Wik Peoples v. Queensland,71 the Court found that "there was no
necessary extinguishment of those rights by reason of the grant of
pastoral leases." 72
The response of the federal Parliament to Mabo (No 2) under
the Keating labor government was to enact the Native Title Act 1993
(Cth). This gave a statutory basis to the common law native title
recognised by the High Court. It also had the effect of overriding
Western Australian legislation, as a result of section 109 of the
Australian Constitution.73 The Western Australian legislation had sought
to extinguish all native title subsisting in Western Australia and thus to
wholly negate the effect of the common law as declared in Mabo
(No 2).74
The approach of the subsequent Howard government to the
decision in the Wik Case was less benign. In response to fears from
farmers and miners that the decision would affect their economic well-
being, prompted in part by suggestions fromh the government itself that
the decision would lead to such a result and that large sections of
Australia would now be subject to native title claims, including perhaps
people's own "backyards," 75 the government announced a "ten point
plan" for native title. In the words of Deputy Prime Minister Tim
70 (1992), 175 C.LR. 1 [hereinafter Mabo (No. 2)].
71 (1996), 187 C.LR. 1 at 133 [hereinafter Wik Case].
72 Ibid. at 133.
73 Section 109 states: "When a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth,
the latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid."
74 In Western Australia v. Commonwealth (Native Title Act Case) (1995), 183 C.L.R. 373 the
High Court unanimously held that the Land (Titles and Traditional Usage) Act 1993 (W.A.) was
completely inoperative as it was inconsistent with both the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) and
the Native Title Act.
75 This notion was rejected in Fejo v. Northern Territory (1998), 195 C.L.R. 96, in which the
High Court held that native title is extinguished by a grant of freehold title.
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Fischer, this plan would produce "bucket-loads of extinguishment." 76
The package was enacted as the Native Title Amendment Act 1998
(Cth),77 and in reducing the native title rights of Indigenous Australians
had also to override the protection provided by the Racial Discrimination
Act 1975 (Cth) from discrimination on the basis of race.78 Hence, while
section 7(1) of the Native Title Amendment Act states that "this Act is
intended to be read and construed subject to the provisions of the Racial
Discrimination Act," section 7(2) provides that the Racial Discrimination
Act has no operation where the intention to override native title in the
Native Title Amendment Act is unambiguous.
The lessening of Aboriginal rights to native title brought about
by the Native Title Amendment Act created great division in Australian
society, and contributed to the rise of new extreme right wing parties
such as Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party. This party saw even the
"ten point plan" as caving into Aboriginal interests, and has as its policy:
"To repeal the native title legislation, abolish ATSIC and reverse the
effect of the Wik Legislation." 79 The rise of Pauline Hanson's One
Nation Party and perceptions that the Native Title Amendment Act had
caused injustice to Indigenous peoples also produced a countervailing
reaction amongst other Australians, who in response rallied behind the
reconciliation process.
B. The Stolen Generations
There has been in recent years further exposure of the many
human rights abuses that have afflicted Indigenous peoples over the last
century. The most important revelations concerned the so-called "Stolen
Generations." Over most of the twentieth century, Aboriginal children
were forcibly taken from their family for adoption or to be placed into
76 J. Brough, "Wik Draft Threat to Native Title," [Sydney] Morning Herald (28 June 1997) 3.
7 7 Hereinafter Native Title Amendment Act.
78 Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), s. 10(1) [hereinafter Racial Discrimination Act] states
that: "If, by reason of, or of a provision of, a law of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory,
persons of a particular race, colour or national or ethnic origin do not enjoy a right that is enjoyed
by persons of another race, colour or national or ethnic origin, or enjoy. a right to a more limited
extent than persons of another race, colour or national or ethnic origin, then, notwithstanding
anything in that law, persons of the first-mentioned race, colour or national or ethnic origin shall, by
force of this section, enjoy that right to the same extent as persons of that other race, colour or
national or ethnic origin."
79 Pauline Hanson's One Nation (2001), online: <http://onenation.com.au/object.htm> (date
accessed: 24 May 2001).
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institutions. This was the subject of an inquiry by the Human Rights and
Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOc) headed by its president, Sir
Ronald Wilson, a former justice of the High Court. Its 1997 report,
Bringing Them Home,80 found:
Nationally we can conclude with confidence that between one in three and one in ten
Indigenous children were forcibly removed from their families and communities in the
period from approximately 1910 until 1970. In certain regions and in certain periods the
figure was undoubtedly much greater than one in ten, In that time not one Indigenous
family has escaped the effects of forcible removal (confirmed by representatives of the
Queensland and WA [Western Australian] Governments in evidence to the Inquiry).
Most families have been affected, in one or more generations, by the forcible removal of
one or more children.81
HREOC concluded:
'Indigenous families and communities have endured gross violations of their human
rights. These violations continue to affect Indigenous people's daily lives. They were an
act of genocide, aimed at wiping out Indigenous families, communities and cultures, vital
to the precious and inalienable heritage of Australia. 82
The Inquiry recommended that reparations be made to the Stolen
Generations, including an apology and monetary compensation.83
Members of the Stolen Generations also issued a legal challenge
in the High Court, in which they argued that the Aboriginals Ordinance
1918 (N.T.) was invalid insofar as it authorized the forced removal of
Aboriginal children from their families and communities. The
Ordinance was challenged by six plaintiffs, five of whom were Aboriginal
Australians who, as children, had been forcibly removed from their
families under the Ordinance. The sixth plaintiff was an Aboriginal
mother whose child had been taken from her. The High Court held in
Kruger v. Commonwealth84 that the enactment was valid. In the absence
of a bill of rights, there was no legal recourse for the children or their
parents. A further test case was brought in tort seeking damages, but this
80 Australia, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Bringing Them Home: Report
of the National Inquiry into the Separation ofAboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from their
Families (Sydney: Sterling Press, 1997) [hereinafter Bringing Them Home].
81 Ibid. at 37.
82 Australia, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Bringing Them Home-
Community Guide, (Sydney: Sterling Press, 1997), online: Australian Legal Information Institute
<http:/Avww.austlii.edu.au/au/special/rsjprojectrsjlibraryhreoc/stolen-summary> (date accessed: 8
June 2001).
83 Bringing Them Home, supra note 80 at 282.
84 (1997), 190 C.LR. 1.
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was also lost.85 The manifest injustice of such outcomes, in regard to an
issue that produced strong emotional reactions in many Australians, was
very important in creating a tide of community support for Indigenous
people and their claims.
Reparations in the form of an apology or monetary
compensation have yet to be made to the Stolen Generations. Concern
at the continuing lack of redress has focused upon Prime Minister
Howard's refusal to apologize for past injustices.8 6 This has contributed
to popular support for legal change and for recognition of the special
position of Indigenous peoples in Australian society. The refusal to
apologize has lead to an unofficial annual "National Sorry Day" being
supported throughout Australia and the launch of a "Journey of
Healing."
C. 2000: The Year of Reconciliation
The Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation has described 2000 as
"the year for reconciliation."8 7 Reconciliation was made a central theme
of the Sydney Olympics from the moment Aboriginal athlete Nova Peris-
Kneebone became the first person to run in Australia with the Olympic
torch, which she received at Uluru (formerly known as Ayres Rock).
Reconciliation was a theme in both the opening and closing ceremonies,
with the lighting of the flame by an Aboriginal woman, Cathy Freeman.
This was followed by general public elation, and not a little relief, at
Freeman's winning of a gold medal in the four hundred metres track
event. The effect of a sporting event such as the Sydney Olympics upon
Australian political attitudes and culture should not be underestimated.
Perceptions of the great success of the event are inextricably linked with
positive attitudes towards the reconciliation process.
The year 2000 also saw the phenomenon of the Bridge Walks for
Reconciliation in capital cities and towns across Australia. Around a
quarter of a million people took part in the People's Walk for
Reconciliation across the Sydney Harbour Bridge on the twenty-eighth
of May in what was one of largest public demonstrations for a cause ever
seen in Australia. Hundreds of thousands more people joined bridge
85 Cubillo v. Commonwealth (No. 2) (2000) 103 F.C.R. 1.
86 Howard has, however, indicated his "deep and sincere regret" for past injustices against
Aboriginal peoples: Australia, House of Representatives, Hansard (26 August 1999) at 9165.
8 7Final Report, supra note 69 at xii [emphasis in original]. Although it was also careful to note
that this was "not yet the year of reconciliation."
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walks and related events on the same day and in the following weeks in
cities and towns around Australia.
V. THE FUTURE: RECONCILIATION
AND THE CONSTITUTION
The Final Report of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation
made it clear that reconciliation will require several changes to
Australia's legal structure. Two directly affect the Australian
Constitution.
A. A New Preamble
The council recommended that the Australian Constitution be
altered to "recognise Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples as
the first peoples of Australia in a new preamble to the Constitution."8 8 A
new preamble would not grant any new rights to Indigenous people, but
would be an important symbolic statement. At best, such a statement
might be used by the High Court to resolve the open question of
whether the races power can be applied to discriminate against
Aboriginal people.89
An attempt has already been made to draft a new preamble to
the Constitution. In the midst of the debate over an Australian republic
in 1999, Prime Minister Howard announced that a second referendum
question would also be put before the Australian people concerning a
new preamble.9 0 He then, without public or Indigenous involvement,
drafted a new preamble. His proposed version contained a clause that
read: "Since time immemorial our land has been inhabited by
Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders, who are honoured for their
ancient and continuing cultures."9 1 Howard's preamble attracted little
support as a result of its awkward and confused wording, refusal to
88 Ibid. at 105.
89 Compare, however, section 125A of the Constitution Alteration (Preamble) 1999 (Cth),
which would have been inserted into the Constitution along with the preamble put to the people in
the unsuccessful 1999 referendum on an Australian republic. Section 125A read: "The preamble to
this Constitution has no legal force and shall not be considered in interpreting this Constitution or
the law in force in the Commonwealth or any part of the Commonwealth."
90 See G. Williams, "Why Australia Kept the Queen" (2000) 63 Sask. L. Rev. 477.
91 M. McKenna, "The Tyranny of Fashion: John Howard's Preamble to the Australian
Constitution" (1999) 10 Public L Rev. 163 at 163.
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acknowledge the original occupancy and custodianship of Australia by
Indigenous peoples, a bizarre reference to "mateship," and the fact that
it had been drafted without public consultation. He subsequently
produced a new preamble that was revised according to a deal between
the government and the Democrats, who held the balance of power in
the senate, before being rushed through parliament. The revised
preamble put to the Australian people on 6 November 1999 contained a
clause that read:
We the Australian people commit ourselves to this Constitution ... honouring Aborigines
and Torres Strait Islanders, the nation's first people, for their deep kinship with their
lands and for their ancient and continuing cultures which enrich the life of our country9 2
Like the vote on the republic itself, the referendum on the preamble was
defeated nationally and in all six states. Nationally, the preamble
received a "Yes" vote of 39.34 per cent and a "No" vote of 60.66 per
cent.93 It was not widely embraced by the Indigenous community.
Although it made reference to them, the reference was still ungenerous.
"Kinship," rather than "custodianship," was used to describe the
relationship of Indigenous peoples to the land. Unfortunately, "kinship"
does not easily apply to the connection between a person and a place or
thing. The next time a preamble is drafted, the process ought to involve
consultation with Aboriginal people and the community more broadly.
B. A Treaty
The Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation recommended that
"the Commonwealth Parliament enact legislation ... to put in place a
process which will unite all Australians by way of an agreement, or
treaty, through which unresolved issues of reconciliation can be
resolved." 94 The idea of a treaty has long been supported by the
Indigenous community, and the current elected chair of ATSIC, Geoff
Clark, restated the call for a treaty between Indigenous peoples and the
Australian Government at the Corroboree 2000 convention. It is difficult
92 Constitution Alteration (Preamble) 1999 (Cth).
93 Referendum '99 National Results, online: Australian Election Commission <http://
www.referendum.aec.gov.au/tallyroom/Nat .Tableq2.thm> (date assessed: 23 May 2001).
94 See Final Report, supra note 69 at 106, the Reconciliation Bill 2000 in Appendix III, which
was drafted to set out such a process. The author was a consultant to the council on the drafting of
this legislation.
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to see how the reconciliation process can move forward without such an
agreement.
A treaty might be the lynchpin of the next stage in the
reconciliation process. It could open up the Australian political and legal
system, which, since federation, has largely excluded Indigenous peoples.
In this context, a treaty signifies nothing more than an agreement
between two or more parties. While it has connotations that suggest an
agreement between sovereign nation states, this need not be the case. In
many other countries, a treaty has been signed between the settler and
Indigenous inhabitants as a way of striking an agreement on governance
and other issues. New Zealand provides a good example, with the Treaty
of Waitangi, signed in 1840. In fact, a treaty is the normal and accepted
way in other nations of achieving an appropriate settlement. Australia is
the only Commonwealth nation that does not have a treaty with its
Indigenous peoples.95
Understood in this way, a treaty should not be of any greater
concern than, say, something that might be called a framework
agreement. Of course, the enormous difficulties cannot be hidden by
whatever name is adopted for the instrument. Many questions would
arise, such as who would negotiate on behalf of Indigenous peoples, and
whether the treaty would grant Indigenous peoples a measure of self-
government.
There is no constitutional reason why a treaty could not
recognise a measure of sovereignty or self-government for Indigenous
peoples. This could be developed within the existing legal system. The
Australian Federation already encompasses different laws co-existing at
the federal, state, and local levels. The High Court in Mabo (No 2) has
also given legal effect to the native title of Indigenous peoples and has
found that the content of this title is defined by Indigenous legal and
cultural traditions. 96 This did not fracture Australia's existing system of
law, but was accommodated within it.97
For Indigenous peoples, problems such as poverty are
inextricably linked with the lack of control over their own lives. A treaty
could grant them a greater say over their affairs and give them the place
95 Ibid. at 6.
96 Mabo (No 2), supra note 70 at 58 per Justice Brennan: "Native title has its origin in and is
given its content by the traditional laws acknowledged by and the traditional customs observed by
the indigenous inhabitants of a territory. The nature and incidents of native title must be
ascertained as a matter of fact by reference to those laws and customs."
97 See also Coe v. Commonwealth (No. 2) (1993), 118 A.L.R. 193; and Walker v. New South
Wales (1994), 182 C.LR. 45.
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they have yet to gain within the Australian legal system. This would not
give them special rights or privileges, but, like other Australians, provide
a greater say over their own destiny. In moving forward in this direction,
Australia has much to learn from both the successes and mistakes of
Canada, and will undoubtedly look to nations such as Canada for
guidance in the future.
VI. CONCLUSION
The framing of the Australian Constitution through to the early
decades of the Australian nation saw a pattern of discrimination emerge
against Australia's Indigenous peoples. This was based upon their
exclusion from Australian political and cultural life, and was a
consequence of the legal system and the attitudes of the day. This
pattern took hold and was only broken in 1967 by the referendum that
deleted discriminatory provisions from the Australian Constitution.
Unfortunately, that referendum failed to establish a new pattern or
vision of the place of Indigenous peoples within Australia's political and
legal structure.
Today, there is strong community support in Australia finally to
embrace Indigenous peoples as an integral and unique component of the
Australian nation. This support has yet to be translated into meaningful
results. As Australians celebrate the centenary of federation, no progress
has yet been made on the recognition of Australia's Aboriginal peoples
in the Australian Constitution. There has been a false start on the
question of a new preamble, but the reconciliation process may yet
produce in the longer term a preamble that involves Aboriginal people
in its drafting. It should also produce a treaty that will set out the legal
status of Indigenous peoples within the Australian Federation.
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